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REFLECTIONS ON UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN
FUTURO:
SHAVERS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL
AND
ROBINSON V. CAHILL
The venerated doctrine that unconstitutional statutes are void ab
initio has long ceased to hold sway in this country. Factors such as
administrative problems and detrimental reliance have led courts
to hold statutes unconstitutional prospectively from the date of the
opinion. 1
More recently, the rise in public law litigation has led to further
judicial innovations in developing remedies which affect major
societal institutions. 2 This article will discuss a judicial holding
used recently by two state supreme courts which delays a statute's
unconstitutionality to some date in the future beyond the date of
the opinion. This holding, referred to as "unconstitutionality in
futuro," has three distinct features: delayed effectiveness of the
holding of unconstitutionality to some date beyond the date of the
opinion, a set of suggested guidelines provided by the court for the
benefit of the legislature or the executive which will, if followed,
save the statute from being voided at a future date, and the retention of jurisdiction over the case by the court.
While unconstitutionality in futuro provides an effective means
of judicial control over the response of the legislature or executive
to actions of the judiciary, the doctrine raises serious concerns
about the proper role of the judiciary. First, unconstitutionality in
futuro may adversely affect judicial legitimacy, which is essential
to the strength of the courts as an independent branch of government. Second, courts may lack the necessary competence to deal
successfully with the ongoing problems present in litigation which
addresses broad public issues, and may use unconstitutionality in
futuro without first testing it against firmjudicial standards. Third,
since the court's remedy in a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro is dependent upon actions of the other branches of government, the long-term remedies may fail to provide relief for the parties. Finally, holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro must be re-

• See notes 12-15 and accompanying text infra.

• The problems presented to courts by public law litigation and the need for innovative
judicial treatment of cases are not confined to the federal level. The jurisprudential issues
confront both federal and state courts. Most of the discussion, however, is drawn from
federal cases because that is where the focus of most commentators' analyses lie.
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conciled with the separation of powers doctrine which restrains
one governmental branch from exercising the powers of another
branch.
In discussing these issues, this article will argue that holdings of
unconstitutionality in futuro are difficult to reconcile with the separation of powers doctrine because they foster impermissible intrusions on the ability of the legislative and executive branches to act
indepenqen tly of the judiciary. It is further argued that in the two
cases where courts have adopted the unconstitutionality in futuro
approach, the failure to satisfy all of the proposed standards for the
appropriateness of unconstitutionality in futuro and the further
considerations of judicial legitimacy and competency should have
led the courts to consider other less drastic alternatives before deciding to use unconstitutionality in futuro.
I.

PuBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND INNOVATIVE JUDICIAL REMEDIES

A. Development of Prospective and Prospective-Prospective

Holdings

Traditionally, civil adjudication has been primarily a process of
resolving private disputes having immediate impact solely on the
parties directly involved. 3 Courts today, however, are frequently
confronted with complex litigation involving broad public issues
which affect others than the parties involved in the suit. Such litigation demands of judges great sensitivity to the rights and duties of
the parties before the court and also to the far-reaching ramifications which these cases will have for unrepresented parties and the
public in general. A leading commentator has described suits with
these characteristics as "public law litigation. " 4
3
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285
(1976). The traditional private litigation model is bipolar: the parties and interests are
diametrically opposed, and only one can be the winner. The immediate consequences of
prevailing in the action accrue solely to the parties to the suit. An example of the private
litigation model is the simple contract case in which one party is awarded damages or
specific performance by the court.
4
Id. at 1284. Under this model, it is recognized that the litigation has far-reaching effects which are not confined to the persons on the other side of the traditional bipolar
structure. The following features are characteristic of the public law litigation model: 1)
the scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped primarily by the courts and
parties, as is demonstrated in the liberalization of formal pleadings; 2) the party structure
is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous, as shown in the relaxation of joinder
rules; 3) the factual inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and legislative;
4) relief is not compensatory for past wrong, but forward-looking and fashioned ad hoc
along flexible lines; 5) the remedy is not imposed but negotiated; 6) the decree does not
terminate judicial involvement - its administration requires the court's continued involvement; 7) the judge takes an active part in negotiating the remedy rather than remaining a neutral arbiter; 8) the subject matter is not a dispute between private individuals but
a grievance about the operation of public policy. Id. at 1302.
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In public law litigation the relationship between the relative
rights of the parties, the holding of a case, and the remedy provided
is changed. Under the traditional civil litigation model, right and
remedy are interdependent. The scope of the remedial relief flows
from the substantive legal violation on the theory that compensat~on is measured by the harm caused by the breach of duty. 5 Under
the public law litigation model, right and remedy are separated.
The remedy does not follow logically from a finding of a substantive violation but rather is decided in light of the circumstances in
each case. The remedy is not a final transfer of money or services
but instead is often a program which takes into account future consequences and other interests. 6
Therefore, since public law litigation cases often cannot properly
be settled by traditional remedies such as money damages, and
often involve major institutional adjustments, courts have more
frequently employed novel and quasi-legislative remedies. As a result, the role of judges has shifted from being that of primarily disinterested arbiters of private disputes to that of public policymakers and enforcers. 7
The advent of public law litigation has demanded of judges a flexibility in their treatment of cases in which the common law has
been overruled or statutes declered unconstitutional. 8 With one
exception, 9 unconstitutional statutes or common law doctrines
which have been overruled have traditionally been held void ab initio~ 10 As such, the holdings in these cases have been given reId. at 1282-83.
Id. at 1293-94.
7 Id. at 1286, 1302.
8
See notes 18-20 and accompanying text infra.
9
Decisions overruling prior state statutory interpretations affecting obligations on a
contract are not given retroactive effect. Such a holding would contravene the Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from passing any law
"impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. See, e.g., United
States Trust ofN. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. I. See, e.g., United
and New Jersey entered into a contractual agreement in 1962 concerning bonds issued by
· the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Both states passed legislation, effective
in 1973, which made the 1962 agreement inapplicable. The Court held that the New Jersey
law violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. But see Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The Court upheld the validity of the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium Act, reasoning that an emergency situation justifies the passage of
state legislation which modifies or abrogates contracts already in effect.
• 0 The void ab initio theory states that if a statute is unconstitutional now, it must have
been unconstitutional at its enactment and therefore was never a law. See Note,
Prospective-Prospective Ove"uling, 51 MINN. L. REv. 79, 79-80 & n.3 (1966). For an example of a void ab initio holding, see Stanton v. Lloyd Hammond Produce Farms, 400
Mich. 135, 253 N.W.2d 114 (1977). The Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs
injuries had been sustained during the course of his employment. The injuries occurred
before the statutory exclusion of agricultural workers from wage benefit coverage was declared unconstitutional, but they occurred after the injuries to the plaintiffs in the case in
which the statutory exclusion was declared unconstitutional. The court decided, therefore, that its ruling would apply retroactively and the statute would be void from the date
of its enactment.
5

6

264

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 12:2

troactive effect. 1 1 Today courts have universally displaced retroactive holdings with prospective holdings in situations where
parties have relied on a statute or precedent, or where a retroactive
holding would be unduly harsh or burdensome. 12 The constitutional validity of prospective holdings of unconstitutionality has
been firmly established. 13 Prospective holdings may apply prospectively to the cases in which they are announced, 14 or they may
be applicable not to the cases in which they are announced but to
every case arising thereafter. 1 5
At the federal level, prospective holdings have become particularly common in the area of criminal procedure. 16 They are also
11
A "retroactive" or "retrospective" rule of law relates back to transactions which
occurred before it came into force. See Chicago,·1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559
(1913); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886); Horrigan v. Klock, 27 Mich. App.
107, 183 N.W.2d 386 (1970); Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 379
Mich. 160, 150 N. W .2d 752 (1967). For a brief treatment of the reasons for retroactive application of rules of law, see Note, Prospective-Prospective Ove"uling, 51 MINN. L. REV.
79, 79-80 (1966).
12
See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 111.2d II, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) (where the court abolished the rule of sovereign immunity from tort suits with respect to school districts, the court may restrict the application of
the new rule to the instant case and to cases arising in the future, where retroactive application will result in hardship to t1lose who have relied upon prior decisions of the court).
See also Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. I,
7-16 (1960); Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional
or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1947).
13
Prospectivity was established as an alternative to retroactivity in the landmark decision, Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). Certiorari
was granted to the Supreme Court of Montana to review a judgment affirming a lower
court decision in favor of the plaintiff in an action to recover payments alleged to be an
overcharge for freight. The Court affirmed, rejecting the defendant's argument that the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution was infringed by the prospective
effect given its decision. Id. at 364. Finding that the Federal Constitution is silent on the
matter, the Court held that a state, in defining the limits of adherence to precedent, may
choose between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. Id. See
also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), where the
Court rejected the principle of absolute retroactive invalidity. The Court reasoned that the
effect of the subsequent ruling as to a statute's invalidity should be considered in a number of aspects, with respect to particular individual and corporate relations and particular
private and official conduct. "Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, or
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and its previous application,
demand examination." Id. at 374.
14 See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 111.2d II, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
10
See, e.g., Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, Ill N.W.2d I (1961). Plaintiffexecutrix brought a wrongful death action against the city alleging that negligence caused
ker husband to fall down an elevator shaft. The court denied recovery to the plaintiff on
the grounds of city immunity from suit, but stated that from that day forward, the doctrine
of governmental immunity from tort suit was abrogated.
16 See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), establishing that the dedsion
whether to give a ruling of unconstitutionality retroactive or prospective effect should depend on the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule. Id. at 629. In criminal
procedure, the purpose is not to free properly convicted criminals, which retroactive application of the new rule would tend to do, but instead to curb illegal police practices. Id.
at 637. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that an accused prisoner had the right to be apprised of all of his rights before interrogation. The Court did
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common in civil cases, 17 especially in areas of important and enduring human interest, such as school desegregation, 18 school aid
tax programs, 19 and voter reapportionment cases. 20
At least three state supreme courts, in deciding cases with a significant public impact, have introduced a variation on the principle
of prospective holdings, delaying the application of the new judicial
rule beyond the date of its announcement. 21 This judicial approach

/

not, however, apply this rule to cases brought before the date of the Miranda decision.
Law enforcement agencies were thereby warned that they would have to modify their interrogation procedures. Prospectivity, however, is not the absolute rule in criminal procedure cases. For an appraisal of the prospectivity-retroactivity problem in this area, see
Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, Forward: The High Coun, The Great Writ, and
the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); cf. Schwartz, Retroaciivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 719
(1966).
17
See notes 12-15 and accompanying text supra.
18 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1295. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown[), 347
U.S. 483 (1954). In this case, the Court declared that racial segregation in public schools
violates equal protection principles, but it did not immediately issue a decree. Instead, the
Court requested additional information from the parties to help it formulate an appropriate decree. One year later, in Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955),
the Court decreed that programs of public school desegregation should be implemented
"with all deliberate speed." Id. at 301. In stating that the compliance should occur with all
deliberate speed, the Court recognized that changes in such a large area could only take
place slowly: See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In these cases the Court refined its
Brown II remedy and required remedies which would cure the effects of past violations as
well as present violations. Each of these remedies was effective prospectively.
19 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), aff g, 348 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The
Court held that where the district court, pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court,
restrained payments to church-related schools, where the parties who had claimed the statute was unconstitutional had not sought interim injunctive relief, and where the churchrelated schools had relied on the forthcoming funds, the funds allocated to reimburse the
schools for services rendered in the interim period could be paid. Thus, where the schools
demonstrated reliance, the holding that the payments were unconstitutional was not allowed to have retroactive effect.
20 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), in which the Court held: I) it is a basic constitutional requirement that seats in both houses of the Alabama legislature be apportioned on a population basis and 2) deviations are permissible so long as they are based on
legitimate considerations of the effectiveness of a rational state policy. In adopting the
"one man-one vote" principle, the Court affirmed a district court order calling for a
temporary reapportionment of the Alabama legislature for the 1962 election and enjoining
officials from holding future elections under what the court had previously decided were
invalid proposed plans. See note 132 and accompanying textinfra.
21 Spane) v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962);
Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N. W .2d 618 (1962). For a discussion of these three cases, see
note 23 infra.
A recent twist on this judicial approach occurred in Whitney v. City of Worcester, 77
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 366 N .E.2d 1210 (1977). In this case, the plaintiff's suit against the
City of Worcester for negligence had been dismissed below on the basis of the doctrine of
municipal tort immunity. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced th·at if
the Massachusetts legislature refused to enact legislation on the subject of municipal tort
immunity before the adjournment of the 1978 legislative session, the court would abrogate
the doctrine in the first case arising thereafter. Id. at 1715, 366 N.E.2d at 1212. The court
further said that if it was forced by legislative inaction to abrogate the doctrine, the overruling would be retroactive to any claim arising after May 13, 1973. Id. at 1735, 366 N.E.2d
at 1220. The court remanded to the trial court pending legislative or judicial action. Id. at
1736, 366 N .E.2d at 1220. For a critical response to Whitney which makes manY. of the
same points regarding this approach, and which labels it prospective-retroactive overrul-
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has been labeled "prospective-prospective overruling. " 22 To date,
it has not been used in cases where a statute has been held unconstitutional but rather when a common law or judicially-created rule
embodying an established public policy determination has been abrogated.23 The rationale for prospective-prospective overruling lies
in an argument of fairness: if it is unfair to impose a new rule oflaw
retroactively on persons who have relied on prior law, then it
would be equally unfair to apply the new rule immediately without
affording a period for adjustment and adaptation. 24 In extending
the principle of prospectivity in this manner, courts have recognized that widespread changes in public behavior occur slowly.
B. Elements of Unconstitutionality In Futuro:
Shavers and Robinson

Recently, two state supreme courts have gone one step beyond
prospective-prospective overruling by holding a statutory scheme
unconstitutional in futuro. 25 An unconstitutional in futuro holding
ing, see Comment, Prospective-Retroactive Overruling: Remanding Cases Pending
l,egislative Determination of Law, 58 B.U.L. REV. 818 (1978).
22 Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 80 (1966).
23See, e.g., Spane! v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,264 Minn. 279, ll8 N.W.2d
795 (1962) (the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defense of sovereign immunity
would no longer be available to school districts and other governmental subdivisions with
respect to torts committed after the adjournment of the next session of the Minnesota
legislature); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (in a suit seeking damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability is abrogated
prospectively as to all claims arising on or after August 15, 1978, which was almost a full
year after the issuance of the opinion); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115
N .W.2d 618 (1962) (the court found that the doctrine of governmental immunity, being itself judicially created, may be changed or abrogated by judicial decision, reasoning that to
enable the various public bodies to make the necessary financial arrangements, the effective date of the abolition of immunity would be approximately six weeks after the issuance
of the opinion, but the decision would nonetheless apply to the case at bar).
24
See Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 82-91 (1966), for
a concise discussion of the background to prospective-prospective overruling and the
theoreticaljustifications for it. See also Grant, The Legal Effect of a Ruling that a Statute
is Unconstitutional, 1978 DET. C.L. REV. 201 (1978). The author examines the legislative
approaches of several countries toward the consequence of each country's highest court
ruling that a statute is unconstitutional. For example, the Austrian Constitution of 1920
provided that a statute which is ruled unconstitutional is automatically annulled. But the
constitutional provision was qualified to recognize the legislative nature of the court's
role in annulling the statute, so that it could delay the annulment up to a full year. Id. at
217. This practice is analogous to a court's use of discretion in prospective-prospective
overrulings.
25 Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N. W.2d 72 (1978); Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). "Unconstitutionality
in futuro" is the phrase used by Justice Ryan in referring to the majority's holding in
Shavers, 402 Mich. at 656,267 N.W.2d at 714 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Catherine Shavers
and four other similarly situated plaintiffs brought an action for a declaratory judgment
against the Attorney General, the Secretary of the State of Michigan, the Commissioner of
Insurance, and several insurance companies challenging the constitutionality of the
Michigan No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101.3179 (West Supp. 1978-79). The Michigan Supreme Court held: 1) the No-Fault Act is
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delays the effect of a finding that a particular statute or provision is
unconstitutional until sometime after the issuance of the court's
opinion. 26 In this regard, unconstitutionality in futuro is similar to
prospective-prospective overruling, but there are significant differences. A prospective-prospective holding merely provides
notice that the law will be changed in a particular manner sometime
after the date of the opinion. 27 Unconstitutionality in futuro has included, in both cases in which it has been used, court-fashioned
programs which the legislature or executive is advised to adopt by
a certain date, on pain of the statute being invalidated as unconstitutional .28 Furthermore, the courts have retained jurisdiction in
order to oversee compliance with remedial orders and to resolve
any problems which might arise. 29 Therefore, the phrase "unconconstitutional to the extent that it provides insurance benefits to victims of motor vehicle
accidents without regard to fault as a ·substitute for tort remedies, which are partially
abolished, and that the Act constitutionally accomplishes this goal; 2) the Act's property
damage protection scheme reasonably relates to the valid public purposes of creating an
incentive to build safer cars, encouraging group rates, and reducing costs by eliminating
the necessity for fault investigation, and 3) while the Act is, theoretically, a valid rational
response to problems affecting the general welfare, the actual mechanisms for protecting
the welfare of individual Michigan motorists who are required by law to purchase NoFault insurance are constitutionally deficient in failing to provide due process. Id. at 57980, 267 N. W .2d at 114. See a /so notes 39-45 and accompanying text infra. The court declared the No-Fault Act unconstitutional, but stated that the ruling would not be effective
until 18 months from the issuance of the opinion.
Similarly, in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), the New Jersey Supreme Court held an educational financing
scheme unconstitutional, the holding to become effective sometime in the future. See
notes 35-42 and accompanying text infra.
26
While in Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978), the
period of delay is both specific and lengthy (18 months), this feature is unusual in cases in
which the existing statute or rule is not voided immediately. Compare· Shavers with
Spane! v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N .W.2d 795 (1962), and
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown/), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Spane/, discussed in note 23
supra, the period of delay was approximately 5 months. 1963 Minn. Sess. Laws Serv.
(West). Brown I held that state action involved in segregated public schools violates the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the massive adjustment necessitated by the decision, the Court in Brown II framed its remedy in terms of an
equitable injunction calling for compliance "with all deliberate speed," which enabled the
Court to put its new ruling into effect slowly. See also In re Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130
N.W.2d 473 (1964), in which the Minnesota court held Totten trust assets subject to the
forced share of the surviving spouse, but made this a prospective-prospective ruling. In
this case, -the court was even less specific than in Spane/ as to the time which should
elapse before the new rule would take effect: "We would prefer the Restatement rule
.... However, in view of the widespread use of Totten trusts we do not feel free to adopt
the Restatement rule without first giving the legislature an opportunity to provide for it by
statute .... "Id. at 195, 130 N. W.2d at 481. There was thus no specification at all of when
the ruling would be effective.
21 See note 23 supra.
28
See Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 607-08, 267 N .W.2d 72, 91 (1978);
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson/), 62 N.J. 473, 519-20, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (1973).
29
Some cases of prospective overruling feature suggested guidelines and retention of
jurisdiction. For example, in Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown/), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
Court retained jurisdiction and asked for further information and reargument on the issue
of an appropriate remedy. In Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown//), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the
function of the delayed implementation of the Court's decree, which was a type of prospective holding, is slightly different from the function of delayed unconstitutionality in a
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stitutionality in futuro" refers to all holdings simultaneously
exhibiting these three distinguishing features: the postponement of
the effect of the holding, the inclusion of suggested guidelines for
future legislative or executive action, and the retention of jurisdiction by the court. The coexistence of these three features distinguishes unconstitutionality in futuro from prospective and
prospective-prospective holdings. 30
The most recent example of a court's use of unconstitutionality
in futuro is Shavers v. Attorney General. 31 In an action for a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the Michigan No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that the measures provided to assure that compulsory
No-Fault insurance would be available to motorists at fair and
equitable rates are inadequate and in violation of state due process
principles. The court held the act defective for the following reasons: 1) the statutory protection against "excessive, inadequate, or
unfairly discriminatory'' rates was without the support of clarifying
rules established by the Commissioner of Insurance, without a
legislatively sufficient definition, and without any history of prior
court interpretation, so that the legislative mandate was thus reduced to "mere exhortation;" 32 2) there were inadequate statutory
holding of unconstitutionality in futuro. The function of the Brown II decree was primarily
a practical one: to allow individual public school boards time to devise their own
strategies for compliance which could not have been devised overnight. On the other
hand, the function of the delayed unconstitutionality in a holding of unconstitutionality in
futuro is not only to give the legislature or executive time to devise remedies of their own
but to provide an impetus for adopting the court-suggested guidelines. If the legislature or
executive fails to act, the responsibility for any further judicial action rests not with the
court but with the branch that has failed to act.
30 Of these three distinguishing features, only the timing aspect is present in
prospective-prospective overruling. There is usually no need for the court to retain jurisdiction and no reason to suggest guidelines for future action in a case where the common
law or a judicial rule has been abrogated. However, as in/n re Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130
N .W.2d 473 (1964), a court may suggest that the legislature enact legislation to replace an
abrogated common law rule. The public must in most circumstances simply prepare for
and live with the new rule.
31 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978).
32 Id. at 602, 267 N. W.2d at 88. The section of the Insurance Code dealing with rates
charged to insureds states, inter alia: "(I) All rates shall be made in accordance with the
following provisions: ... (d) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 500.2403(1) (West Supp. 1978-79). The section
further states:
(I) Every insurer authorized to write and writing automobile bodily injury liability and property damage liability insurance in this state shall participate in an organization for the purpose of: (a) Providing the guarantee that automobile insurance coverage will be available to any person who is unable to procure such insurance through ordinary methods. (b) Preserving to the public the benefits of
price competition by encouraging maximum use of the normal private insurance
system. (2) The organization created under this chapter shall be called the
"Michigan automobile insurance placement facility."
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3301(1) (West Supp. 1978-79). Standing alone, this section
is procedurally vague. But Justice Ryan in his dissent notes that the "various underwrit-
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provisions available to a motorist to attack the validity of an individual rating decision: 33 and 3) there was no adequate statutory
provision permitting an individual to challenge insurance refusal,
discriminatory cancellation, or assignment to the "Automobile
Placement Facility" with its presumptively higher rates .34
The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged that the constitutional status of the Michigan No-Fault Act put it in "an extraordinary jurisprudential position:" the Act was held constitutional in
its general thrust, but unconstitutionally deficient in its administrative mechanisms. 35 The court went on to say that it believed it
necessary for "the purposes of general jurisprudence, the general
welfare of the public and the administration of justice" to hold that
the Act would remain in effect for eighteen months from the issuance of its opinion. 36 Furthermore, the court set out minimum
standards which the No-Fault Act must meet in order to pass constitutional muster. 37 The Michigan legislature was invited by the
court to implement these standards to save the Act. While it is true
ing guidelines currently employed by state-regulated casualty insurers are not alleged to
be arbitrary or discriminatory either by the majority or by the plaintiffs on appeal." 402
Mich. at 652 n.10, 267 N.W.2d 112 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
·
33
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 500.2406 (West Supp. 1978-79) (filings and supporting data for such rating decisions which have been submitted by insurers are open for public inspection only after filing becomes effective).
34
402 Mich. at 603-04, 267 N.W.2d at 89. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 500.3365.
(West Supp. 1978-79). The "Automobile Placement Facility" is a legislatively-created
facility for those motorists who have been refused insurance coverage by private insurers,
or who are unable to obtain it for any reason. The court states that a motorist who is
placed in the Automobile Placement Facility "is subject to a statutory presumption that
the rates charged will be higher than the rates for motorists in the open marketplace." 402
Mich. at 604, 267 N.W.2d at 89.
35
402 Mich. at 608-09, 267 N.W.2d at 91-92.
36 Id. at 608-09, 267 N.W.2d at 91-92.
37
Id. at 607-08, 267 N.W.2d at 91. The court stated that no-fault insurance does not
satisfy minimum constitutional due process requirements unless:
I. The Legislature and/or the Commissioner of Insurance (pursuant to his present rule-making authority, MCL 500.2484; MSA 24.12484), give substantial
meaning to the statutory standards "Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or
unfairly discriminatory" ...
2. A filed rate, or a rate determined on administrative or judicial review, provides and sets forth:
a) premiums reasonable to insured and insurer for the specific insurance
coverage without regard to factors assertedly warranting differences in premiums among those insured;
b) the factors which properly may be considered by the insurer in differentiating premiums among those insured, and;
c) the amount of differential appropriate for each such factor.
3. Such information for each insurer is publicized in such a manner that every
person affected can readily ascertain the factors and amounts of differentials applicable to him and calculate the premium the insurer may charge.
4. Every motorist has the opportunity to obtain a prompt and effective administrative review of an insurer's calculation of the factors, differentials and
premium applicable to him and a prompt and effective administrative review of
the basis for the refusal or cancellation of insurance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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that the list of minimum standards did not constitute a courtordered program which the legislature was obliged to follow, it was
nonetheless a powerful signal to the legislature of what the court
would find acceptable to cure the due process infringement. Finally, the court stated that "at an appropriate time before eighteen
months from the issuance of [the] opinion, [it would] re-examine
the constitutional status of the No-Fault Act in terms of remedying
the present due process deficiencies. " 38 At that time, an appropriate order reflecting the Act's constitutional status will be entered.
As precedent for its holding, the Michigan Supreme Court cited
only one case, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1). 39 In Robinson I,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state's educational
financing scheme was unconstitutional because it failed to "furnish
[a] thorough and efficient system of public schools .... " 40 It
suggested that if the state desired to delegate the task of accomplishing its obligation to maintain and support a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools, it must do so through a plan
which would fulfill its continuing obligation. 41 More specifically,
the state had to define adequately what that obligation was and
compel local school districts to raise enough money to meet the ob""id.at 609-10, 267 N.W.2d at 92.
39 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) [hereinafter, references to the entire Robinson controversy will be to Robinson and references to the particular case before the court will be enumerated Robinson I - Robinson VI]. In this case,
action was brought by residents, taxpayers, and various municipal officials challenging
the constitutionality of the system of financing public schools in New Jersey. In handing
down its decision that the New Jersey educational tax scheme was unconstitutional, the
New Jersey Supreme Court suggested guidelines, which, if adopted, would ensure the
enactment of a constitutional scheme; it delayed the effect of its holding until the end of
the current school year, and retained jurisdiction in order to monitor compliance with its
decree.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's first brush with Robinson did not dispose of the controversy, but marked the beginning of a lengthy period of administrative headaches for the
court. During the next three years the case returned five times to the court, and each time
the court delayed rendering a final decision by issuing provisional orders and holding that
the existing statutory scheme should remain in force for the next school year. See Shavers
v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 609 n.33, 267 N. W.2d 72, 92(1978), and id. at 670 n.5,
267 N.W.2d at 120 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). See also Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case
Study In Judicial Self-Legitimation, 8 RuT.-CAMD. L.J. 508-25 (1977), which criticizes the
New Jersey Supreme Court's issuance of the initial injunction and its subsequent handling
of the case, stating that the first opinion has the "appearance of a judicial fiat [and that]
(e]xacerbating this perception is the realization that 'the same small group of persons
[were] responsible for making the initial determination of unconstitutionality now invoked
as the compelling reason for a further assertion of power.' "Id. at 518 (footnote omitted).
In finally disposing of the case, the court in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155,
358 A.2d 457 (1976), issued an injunction which froze spending for public schools after the
court in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson///), 67 N .J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975) had mandated
an application of provisional remedies. These became unnecessary in light of the legislature's enactment of the Public School Education Act of 1975. The court later held that this
Act facially met the requirements of an efficient system. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V),
69 N .J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
40 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson/), 62 N.J. at 516, 303 A.2d at 294 (1973).
41 id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297.

FALL

1978)

Unconstitutionality in Futuro

271

ligation. 42 Noting, however, that education must continue and that
a period of adaptation was needed for the New Jersey legislature to
enact another statute, the court stated that financial obligations
thereafter incurred by state taxpayers pursuant to the existing statutes pertaining to education financing would be valid in accordance with the terms of the statutes. 43 The court then requested the
further views of the parties and additional argument as to the remedies which should be provided. After hearing further argument,
the court issued a per curiam opinion, of substantially the same
form as the Shavers holding, stating that the court would not disturb the statutory scheme if legislation compatible with the court's
decision was enacted by December 31, 1974, effective no later than
July 1, 1975. 44 The court then retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance.45
Although Shavers and Robinson are presently the only cases
upon which the efficacy of the unconstitutionality in futuro holding
can be judged, together they provide clear examples of some of the
practical and theoretical difficulties inherent in such holdings.
Among the practical difficulties are the necessity of judicial supervision, which requires large expenditures of time and energy on a
single case and the necessity of temporary solutions decided upon
without legislative or administrative assistance, where such assistance would be desirable. These practicalities have perhaps taken
the courts beyond the bounds of constitutional mandates and judicial competence. Among the concerns raised by the courts' use of
this approach are the reconciliation of the unconstitutionality in
futuro concept with the separation of powers doctrine and the need
for the court to maintain its legitimacy. Furthermore, there is the
jurisprudential problem that in issuing a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro, a court may fail to give definite relief to either of the
parties by making the relief conditional on the response of a nonparty, the legislature, or the executive. These considerations
should effectively limit the court's use of unconstitutionality in futuro as a remedy .46

Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297.
Id. at 520-21, 303 A.2d at 298.
44 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson JI), 63 N.J. 196,198,306 A.2d 65, 66 (1973) (The pertinent part of this case is cited in Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. at 609 n.33, .267
N.W.2d at 92).
4s Id.
46 "Remedy" here refers to the type of relief which is granted in the public law litigation
sphere. It is complex and ongoing, and may be negotiated with help from the parties and
with the judge's participation. It is not necessarily final, but may instead be temporary.
Because the declared rights of the parties do not necessarily dictate the form of relief in
public law litigation, courts have great leeway in deciding the form which the relief should
take. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra.
·
42
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LIMITS ON THE USE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN FUTURO

A. Judicial Legitimacy

The judiciary must possess and be perceived by the public as
possessing legitimacy if it is to operate as one of the three distinct
and equally powerful branches of government. It has been said that
legitimacy attaches to actions of courts only when they perform the
functions assigned to them in the manner assigned .47
A court will be accorded legitimacy if it stays within the bounds
of its functions and if it displays competence in performing those
functions. Thus, the concept of judicial legitimacy is strongly
linked to the concepts of judicial function and judicial competence.
The ultimate effectiveness of a court's decision depends on the willingness of society to comply with the decision because it is viewed
as a legitimate exercise of the court's power. Societal compliance
depends in the end upon approval and consensus. 48
47
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 104-05
(1976). Professor ·cox eloquently discusses the importance of legitimacy to the United
States Supreme Court:

The power of the Supreme Court to command acceptance and support not only
for its decisions but also•for its role in government seems to depend upon a suffi.
ciently widespread conviction that it is acting legitimately, that is, performing the
functions assigned to it, and only those functions, in the manner assigned. The
conviction of which I speak is the resultant of many voices, not all carrying equal
weight: of the opinion of the legal profession, of attitudes in the Executive and in
Congress, of the response in State governments, of the press, and of public opinion.
48

Id. at 117-18. Professor Cox puts the matter thusly:

Constitutional adjudication depends, I think, upon a delicate, symbiotic relationship. The Court must know us better than we know ourselves. Its opinions
may ... be the voice of the spirit, reminding us of our better selves.In such cases
the Court ... provides a stimulus and quickens moral education. But while the
opinions of the Court can help to shape our national understanding of ourselves,
the roots of its decisions must already be in the nation. The aspirations voiced by
the Court must be those the community is willing not only to avow but in the end
to live by. For the power of the great constitutional decisions rests upon the accuracy of the Court's perception of this kind of common will and upon the
Court's ability, by expressing its perception, ultimately to command a consensus.
See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 20 (1962). But see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (1978). Professor Tribe states:

Most of the worry about how far judges may go, however genuine it may be and
however fashionable it is again becoming, strikes me as rote unreality, profoundly misconceived in light of the inevitable social and cultural constraints on
judicial intention and impact .... The inescapable boundaries of societal context and consciousness argue not that judges should restrain themselves still
further, but that they must raise distinctive voices of principle. Though I express
occasional reservations about judicial initiative in specific settings, I reject the
assumptions characteristic of Justices like Felix Frankfurter and scholars like
Alexander Bickel: the highest mission of the Supreme Court, in my view, is not
to conserve judicial credibility, but in the Constitution's own phrase, "to form a
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Traditional representative democratic theory holds that legitimacy of judicial action derives from a delegation of power to the
courts from the elected representatives of the people and that
courts should therefore carry out the legislative will. On this
theory, judicial review is countermajoritarian - by invoking the
doctrine of judicial review to hold individual statutes or statutory
schemes unconstitutional, courts act counter to the popular will as
it is expressed in legislation. 49 But it is also generally accepted that
there are some areas in which a majority should not control merely
because it is the majority .50 The judicial branch, and in particular
the United States Supreme Court, has been given the power to define both majority and minority freedom through the interpretation
of the Constitution. 51 In order to perform this task of defining the
respective areas of freedom well, the judiciary must derive and be
perceived as deriving its answers from the Constitution rather than
imposing its own value choices .52
Both public and professional expectations of judicial neutrality
play an important role in our legal tradition and are an important
more perfect Union" between right and rights within that charter's necessarily
evolutionary design.
49
Chayes, supra note 3, at 1314. See also A. BICKEL, supra note 48, at 16. It must be
noted, however, that in theory the popular will is also embodied in the United States Constitution and various state constitutions, and that co11rts therefore act in accord with the
"popular will" when they determine whether a given statute is constitutional.
so Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,2-3
(1971). Bork writes:

If the judiciary really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the society
is not democratic. The anomaly is dissipated, however, by the model of government embodied in the structure of the Constitution, a model ... we may for convenience ... call "Madisonian."
A Madisonian system is not completely democratic, if by "democratic" we
mean completely majoritarian. It assumes that in wide areas of life majorities are
entitled to rule for no better reason than they are majorities .... The model has
also a countermajoritarian premise, however, for it assumes there are some areas
of life a majority should not control .... These are areas properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these aspects of life is tyranny.
51
Id. at 2. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall stated concerning judicial review:

So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the very essence of judicial duty.
52
Bork, supra note 50, at 3. Bork writes concerning the power of the Supreme Court to
define both majority and minority freedom through the interpretation of the Constitution:

[I]t follows that the Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority freedom. If it does not
have such a theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or worse if it pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own predilections, the Court violates the postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifies its power. It then
necessarily abets the tyranny either of the majority or of the minority.
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source of the judiciary' s prestige and legitimacy. 53 In private law
litigation, the judiciary's function is to be a neutral arbiter. 54 The
judiciary's unique neutral function is highlighted when contrasted
with the functions of the other branches. The other branches are
assumed to respond to pressure or to interests which are sometimes highly organized. 55 Courts, on the other hand, render
"legitimate" decisions only when they are perceived as seeking to
disassociate themselves from individual or group interests and adjudicate by disinterested standards. Legitimacy derives from a
realization that decisions are reached not because of some personal
bias on the part of the judge but because they are consistent with
principles which apply to all citizens at all times. 56
Unconstitutionality in futuro poses a threat to the legitimacy of
the judicial branch. Its three distinctive features may signal to the
legislative or executive branch that the court finds fault with its
work, and that the court is willing and able to replace the statutory
scheme with a better one of its own creation. First, this approach
suggests that the court is operating beyond the scope of an impartial arbiter, and is in fact performing a legislative function. Under
the traditional view, the judicial function con sis ts essentially in the
investigation, declaration, and enforcement of liabilities under
existing laws. In contrast, the legislative function is forwardlooking and alters existing conditions by making policy judgments
wnich are applied prospectively .57 Unconstitutionality in futuro is
used in public law litigation, where the line between judicial and
legislative functions is not clear or rigid. Nonetheless, if a court
through a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro seeks to weigh
and balance the same interests which the legislature has already
considered, or to urge its own solution on the legislature, its perceived neutrality is impaired. 58
Second, the court must run the risk that it will in fact fail to implement a better program while becoming enmeshed in remedial
problems. If it fails, a further loss of legitimacy may result. This
53
54

55

see

M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1964).
Chayes, supra note 3, at 1283.
For a classic and critical account of the roles interest groups play in the political arena,
C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1964).

56

A. Cox, supra note 47, at 108-09.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). Mr. Justice Holmes explained:
57

A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under Jaws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose
and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing
conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of
those subject to its power.
58
Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society, 50
582-84 (1967).

MARQ. L. REV.
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loss may occur because the court is inattentive to contemporary
currents of thought in society and seeks by its decisions either to
hasten the process of societal change or to retard the growth of an
attitude which it disfavors. The court may simply be incompetent
to make complex policy decisions within the litigation
framework. 59
The risks are illustrated by both Shavers and Robinson. If the
legislature fails to act after Shavers, the No-Fault Act could be declared void as of January, 1980, and motorists would revert to remedies under traditional negligence and tort laws, which would
create chaos in the insurance field. 60
A more likely judicial response is the issuance of a temporary
remedy similar to the one issued in Robinson /. 61 The initial temporary remedy in Robinson I, which stated that obligations thereafter incurred under the existing statutes would be valid according to
the terms of those statutes, marked the beginning of three years of
administrative problems with the New Jersey education financing
scheme. 62 Temporary remedies such as those provided in Robinson I aggravate the court's involvement in the remedial process. As
provisional remedies they require a response from the affected parties, and will be altered by the court depending on the nature of the
parties' response. The court's follow-up remedy could range from
59
In Justice Mountain's dissent in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 164,
358 A.2d 457, 461-62 (1976), he identifies one frequently raised limitation on the judiciary's
ability:

Finally, removing a matter from legislative or executive control may often result in most unfortunate side effects. The Court may often be unable to view the
governmental problem in its entirety and as a whole. For instance, in the case
before us the obvious effort of the Court is to compel the raising of a very large
amount of money and seeing that it is allocated to educational needs. Worthy as
is this purpose, it takes no account of any number of public needs of which the
Legislature is acutely aware. Welfare, public health, needed renovation and construction of public facilities including correctional institutions, mass transit and
essential increases in the wages and salaries of public employees, to name but a
few, are also very worthy purposes .... If the judiciary seeks satisfactorily to
resolve the problem before it, may not compelling needs be forced to go unmet?
The Legislature can, as it customarily does, take account of all public obligations, and allocate funds accordingly.
0
•
The important point is not that a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro runs a
greater risk of producing chaos than other types of holdings, such as prospective holdings.
Rather, it is that courts should not think that they will always be avoiding chaos by simply
employing a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro.
61
The possibility that the 18 month deadline would be extended and that the Michigan
Supreme Court would refuse to carry out its present plan to void the No-Fault Act if the
Michigan Legislature does not respond satisfactorily was discussed by Chief Justice
Coleman in a television appearance in March, 1979. Coleman stated that a principal criterion in deciding whether to extend the limit would be how close the leislature is to enacting
a remedial measure, but said, "I wouldn't want to go on record saying the court will do
something in a certain situation.'' 18 Michigan Report no.47, at I (Gongwer News Service,
Inc., March 9, 1979) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
62
See notes 39-45 and accompanying text supra.
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finding the parties' response adequate for correcting the deficiency
in the statute to involving the court in the development of an entirely new set of guidelines. Adaptation of this course would involve the Shavers court deeply in the remedial aspects of the case
with no guarantee that the remedial process will do more than
create protracted litigation as in the Robinson cases. 63
Third, by outlining an acceptable response from the legislature
or the executive, the court is resting its legitimacy on a response
from a separate branch of the government which may not be forthcoming. Thus, a key question which any court that is contemplating use of an in futuro holding ought to consider is whether its
mandate will impel the legislature or the executive to appropriate
action. In Shavers, for instance, the Michigan legislature might refuse to act in accordance with the court's directives, because it is
deadlocked over the provisions which would remedy the No-Fault
Act, or because the eighteen-month period proves to be too
short. 64 The court should also be aware of a possible collision between itself and the legislative or executive branch if, subsequent
to the court's formulation of a temporary remedy, the other
branches act on their own and adopt different programs. 65 At the
very least, the court would be embarrassed by the public's tendency to view the legislative or the executive branch as the rightful
source of policy and administrative decisions.
Fourth, there is an inherent danger that a court may undermine
its legitimacy by avoiding its decision-making responsibilities when
it issues a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro. Once a statute or
statutory scheme has been declared unconstitutional in futuro, the
court shifts the responsibility to the legislature or the executive to
act or to demur. The court is no longer seen by itself and by others
as responsible for whether the statute is in fact voided. Ironically,
as the Robinson cases suggest, the legislature, in tum, may not
consider itself the proper dicision-maker.
A court may also be avoiding its fundamental responsibility of
ruling on the legal issues in cases which come before it. Paradoxically, by holding a statute unconstitutional in futuro, a court exercises its traditional judicial function in validating and legitimizing
the use of an existing statutory scheme while simultaneously rendering an opinion regarding the statute's constitutionality. Argu63

See note 39 supra for a discussion of the Robinson litigation.
While 18 months may seem like an adequate period, it may be that the legislature,
knowing it unnecessary to act immediately, will indefinitely delay consideration of remedial legislation. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
65 See A. Cox, supra note 47, at 94-96. Professor Cox generally discusses the proper
function of the Supreme Court within the government, and emphasizes the importance of
each branch remaining within the bounds of its proper role.
64

FALL

1978]

Unconstitutionality in Futuro

277

ably, by declaring a statute unconstitutional and delaying the effect
of that holding a court is upholding an unconstitutional statute. 66 In
theory a statute or statutory scheme which has been held unconstitutional remains void until it is either remedied or replaced. 67
This, however, was not the Shavers court's intention, since it
stated, "[a]t an appropriate time before 18 months from the issuance of this opinion, we will reexamine the constitutional status
of the No-Fault Act in terms of remedying the present due process
deficiencies. " 68 This language indicates that the statute will not be
unconstitutional until the court actually voids it at the end of the
eighteen-month period. Under this alternative interpretation, the
Shavers court's action constitutes a legal fiction which is ajudicial
attempt to sidestep the command of Marbury v. Madison 69 that
courts review the legality of cases which come before them, including the constitutionality of the applicable statute.
Finally, because the legislative and administrative adjustments
to the holdings are made easier by delaying the effect of the holding
and by maintaining the status quo during the interim period, a court
may more hastily conclude that a statute or statutory scheme is unconstitutional than if it could not delay the effect of its holding. As
a result, more statutes or statutory schemes which are defective in
ways which do not amount to traditionally conceived constitutional
deficiencies may be held unconstitutional in futuro on the theory
that this is· an effective means of ensuring that the defect will be
removed, and that there is correspondingly little risk that the court
will have to void the statute. 70

66
In Shavers, the court issued interim directives which included the requirement that
until the legislature or appropriate agency responds to the deficiencies, the Commissioner
is to enforce the present regulatory scheme in the spirit of the court's opinion to assure the
availability of no-fault insurance at fair and equitable rates. Shavers v. Attorney General,
402 Mich. at 610-11, 267 N.W.2d at 92-93.
61
See Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96 (Mun.Ct.App. D.C. 1952) (The underlying principle
is that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished, and that if the decision
is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date). See also Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 218 F.2~ I (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 916 (1955) (by
implication) (an unconstitutional statute may be amended into a constitutional one so far
as its future operation is concerned by removing its objectionable provisions, or by supplying others, to conform it to the requirements.of the Constitution).
68
Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. at 609-10, 267 N.W.2d at 92.
69
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
70
This observation is supported by recent events in the field of administrative law.
There has been at least some recognition by members of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of a relaxation in judicial attitudes toward faulty agency regulations.
HEW Memorandum from Galen Powers to Peter Libassi and Bob Derzon (March 23,
1978) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). The author states that, in the area of
rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the judiciary is
increasingly willing to give agencies an opportunity to correct APA violations while allowing the rule to remain in effect pending substitution of a properly promulgated rule. See
Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Schupak v.
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B. Judicial Competence
1. Ability to Provide a Remedy-Under the traditional model of
private law litigation, the remedy flows more or less directly from
the nature of the violation; 71 relief is given directly to the parties
and the impact of the judgment is confined to them. 72 In contrast,
one of the main features of public law litigation is the increasing
importance of equitable relief that may have consequences for persons not before the court. One test of the court's competency in
handling public law litigation is its ability to formulate a satisfactory program which will work for the parties presently as well as in
the future. 73
In holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro, there is no certainty
that either party to the lawsuit will obtain relief. Because of the delayed effectiveness - and, thus, conditional nature - of the holding, the plaintiffs may never get the relief they sought and to which
the court holds that they are entitled. A comparison of Shavers and
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown Il)7 4 illustrates this point.
Even though the Brown II Court did not begin to penalize the
school districts for noncompliance immediately upon the issuance
of its opinion, it is clear that if subsequently confronted with a
comparable case, the Court would have held that the system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
and would have fashioned appropriate relief. Thus, for purposes of
the remedy given to the parties to the lawsuit, the system was unconstitutional as of the day of the opinion. It is not so clear, on the
other hand, how the Michigan Supreme Court would rule if another
case like Shavers came before it within the eighteen-month interim
period. The court refers to its holding that the No-Fault Act is unconstitutional on due process grounds for failing to provide
adequate administrative remedies as something which it has done.
This indicates that the No-Fault Act is presently unconstitutional,

Mathews, No. 76-2016 (D.C. Cir., filed Nov. 7, 1977); American Health Care Ass'n v.
Califano, 443 F. Supp. 612 (D.D.C. 1977); Humana of S.C., Inc. v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp.
253 (D.D.C. 1976).
The approach taken by the federal district courts and courts of appeals in these cases is
roughly analogous to the Michigan Supreme Court's approach in permitting the No-Fault
Act to remain effective during the 18 month interim period. An important difference, however, is the fact that in these federal cases, no statute has been declared unconstitutional
and therefore it cannot be argued that the federal courts have encroached on the province
of the legislature. Nonetheless, while no legislative action is required to correct the problems in Radway, Humana of S.C., Inc., Schupak, or American Health Care Ass' n, executive action is required.
71
Chayes, supra note 3, at 1282-83. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
72 Chayes, supra note 3, at 1283.
73
See id. at 1298-1301.
74 349 u .s. 294 (1955).
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at least as to its procedural provisions. 75 Even though the statute in
Shavers has been declared unconstitutional, the court ruled that
the Commissioner of Insurance should continue to apply the statute under pre-Shavers law. This is at best a pyrrhic victory for the
plaintiffs in Shavers, who succeeded in having the statutory
scheme they were attacking declared unconstitutional, only to be
told by the court that relief, in the form of voiding the statute,
would be withheld. More generally, there is the danger that future
plaintiffs will also fail to receive immediate relief if they bring suit
prior to the court's final determination of the constitutionality of
the statute.
One commentator, 76 in analyzing recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, identified three additional concerns with regard to
judicial competence: the lack of judicial standards for prospective
choices in complex policy matters; a court's competence to deal
with large amounts of technical data; and a judge's ability to supervise and administer long-term decrees in a manner consistent with
his traditional role as an aloof arbiter. 77 These concerns and their

75

Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. at 611,267 N.W.2d at 93. The court stated:

Although we have held the No-Fault Act's "compulsory insurance requirement" unconstitutional because of insufficient due process protections, effective
as of 18 months from the issuance of this opinion, we again emphasize our concurrent holding that "[d]uring the interim period ... the No-Fault Act's constitutionally valid provisions, as decided in this opinion and subsequent opinions, will
remain in effect.
76 Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13
HARV. C1v. R. - C.L.L. REv. 1 (1978).
11 Id. at 43-44. Goldstein analyzes Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), in which the
Supreme Court declined to enforce a lower court order which reorganized the school districts of an entire metropolitan area and disregarded boundary lines between school districts, pursuant to an order to desegregate. At stake in this case was a metropolitan plan
for bussing pupils from predominantly black schools to white schools, and pupils from
predominantly white schools to black schools. The plan included not only the Detroit
school district but also outlying suburban school districts, even though it had not been
shown by any statistical data that there were implicit plans to maintain a certain ratio of
white to black students. The Court stated that where interdistrict relief was ordered to
remedy a constitutional violation occurring in several districts, boundary lines between
those districts could be ignored. Otherwise, these lines could not be casually ignored or
treated as administrative conveniences because local control over schools is a deeply
rooted tradition and is thought to be essential to the maintenance of the quality of the educational system. 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
Goldstein argues that, in so holding, the Milliken Court stressed the following aspect of
judicial competence: it criticized the district court's attempt to create a metropolitan
school district because it required the court to engage in making technical, bureaucratic,
and financial decisions. Goldstein also notes that courts are considered no more competent to act as day-to-day administrators engaging in on-going supervision than as policymakers, that they are institutions designed "to act occasionally and on principle but not to
respond on a continuing basis to newly arising practical problems." Goldstein, supra note
70, at 44-45 (footnote omitted). Perhaps the most recent expression of this concern by the
Court is found in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), where the Court held that a federal agency's decision to
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implications for unconstitutionality in futuro warrant consideration.
2. Proposed Judicial Standards-The potential lack of judicial
standards is a problem in every vari~ty of public law litigation.
Even in abrogating old tort remedies or state immunity from suit,
various state courts have had to replace old rules with new ones
which are equally without firm judicial standards. 78 But unconstitutionality in futuro is particularly liable to abuse where no firm
judicial standards exist because it is conducive to deepened court
involvement with and control over litigation which is extremely
important to society. With no judicial standards to guide it, a court
employing unconstitutionality in futuro may substitute guidelines
or a temporary scheme arbitrary and unresponsive to the public
policy or political considerations underlying the original scheme.
In light of this admitted problem, it is helpful to consider a possible set of standards for deciding when a court should employ unconstitutionality in future. The standards proposed for guiding
courts in using prospective holdings also offer a basis for judging
the appropriate use of unconstitutionality in futuro. 79
The first standard is whether there has been a clear demonstration that precedent must be overruled or a statutory scheme declared unconstitutional. A clear demonstration requires that there
be no other viable alternatives available to the court exceptjudicial
overruling or declaring the entire statute unconstitutional. In Shavers, the court found the No-Fault Act procedurally deficient, while
holding that the No-Fault Act, insofar as it provides benefits to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to fault, constitutionally accomplishes its goal. 80 Given this unique constitutional
grant the plaintiff corporation a license to build a nuclear reactor would not be overturned
simply on the grounds that the rule-making procedures adopted by the agency were inadequate, which they were not in this case. The Court, through Justice Rehnquist, stated
that the Administrative Procedure Act, at 5 U .S.C. § 553 (1976), establishes the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have courts impose on federal
agencies in conducting rule-making proceedings, and that while agencies are free to grant
additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them. Id. at 524. The
Court nonetheless recognized that this is not an absolute rule: "This is not to say necessarily that there are no circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning
agency action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the
statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare." Id.
78
Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51 MINN. L. REV. 79, 80 (1966). See notes
21-23 supra.
79 See Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicia I Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533,561 (1977).
80
402 Mich. at 579,267 N.W.2d at 77.
The court also stated:
The constitutional status of the No-Fault Act places this Court in an extraordinary jurisprudential position: the No-Fault Act, which has substantially affected
every Michigan motorist, every insurance company underwriting motor vehicle
insurance in Michigan, and our entire system of civiljustice for nearly five years,
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situation, an altemat.ive available to the court would have been to
read the due process requirements into the statute. 81 This would
not require the court to hold the entire statute unconstitutional in
futuro and to risk voiding both the constitutionally sound and constitutionally infirm portions of the statute. Arguably, then, Shavers
does not satisfy the first standard.
Robinson, on the other hand, seems more clearly to have met the
requirement of the first standard. In light of the New Jersey Constitution's mandate to the legislature to provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools, the Robinson court decided that the 1970 Act which provided for school aid on the basis of local taxation and "weighted
pupils" did not satisfy the state's constitutional obligation. 82 There
is no other way that the Robinson court could have accomplished
its purpose of assuring a thorough and efficient system of free public schools except by striking down the entire 1970 Act as unconstitutional. The fault lay with the entire Act, not simply its procedural provisions. While Robinson may satisfy this standard,
however, it arguably raises significant separation of powers problems.83
One alternative to holding a statute unconstitutional in futuro,
which was not available in either Shavers or Robinson because the
statutory schemes had been challenged by plaintiffs alleging harm,
is for the court to issue an advisory opinion. Advisory opinions
have been given in Michigan 84 and also in New Jersey. 85 Advisory
opinions issued in response to legislative action leave to the legislature the process of making the underlying political and policy decisions and minimize the courts' intrusion into these decisions. In
rendering advisory opinions, courts simply perform the traditional
judicial function of determining the constitutionality of a statute.
Thus, where a court may issue an advisory opinion, it is preferable
to holding a statute or statutory scheme unconstitutional in futuro.
While the advisory opinion accomplishes the important end of
warning of the constitutional infirmity of a statute or statutory
scheme, it neither demands the compliance of another branch nor
so clearly risks the disruption of the statutory scheme at a definite
future date.
is constitutional in its ge'neral thrust but unconstitutionally deficient in its
mechanisms for assuring that compulsory no-fault insurance is available to
Michigan motorists at fair and equitable rates.
Id. at 581, 267 N.W.2d at 78.
81
See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
82
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson/), 62 N.J. at 515-19, 303 A.2d at 295-97.
83
See Part II C infra.
84
See Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1974 P.A. 242, 394 Mich. 41, 228
N.W.2d n2 (1975).
85
See, e.g., In re Public Utility Bd., 83 N.J.L. 303, 84 A.706 (1912).
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The second standard is whether the new rule or set of guidelines
is thought to be the best of all possible replacements. In most
cases, this will amount to a less drastic means test, which would
require the court to choose guidelines which are constitutionally
sound but will disrupt the administration of a statutory scheme to a
lesser degree than any other constitutionally sound guidelines. In
these cases, the best possible replacement is that which causes the
least possible disruption. The minimum due process guidelines
which the Shavers court issued may be assumed to meet the second standard because of the court's undoubted competence to
fashion constitutionally sound due process standards and because
the guidelines were accompanied by an interim order to apply all of
the present provisions of the No-Fault Act until the legislature
acted to adopt those guidelines or until the eighteen-month period
passes. Thus, if the legislature responds appropriately, there will
be a minimum of disruption in the administration of the No-Fault
Act.
Whether the Robinson court's desired changes and suggested
guidelines satisfy the second standard as the best of all possible replacements is unclear. The court's yearly appropriations of educational funds together with its statement that the state, in order to
impose a statewide property tax, must tax all taxable property in
the state, or if assigned to local governments, the tax must fall uniformly upon all taxable property within the county or municipality , 86 failed to produce a satisfactory response for three years. In
fact, instead of producing the least possible disruption of public
education in New Jersey, the Robinson court's suggested
guidelines and yearly appropriations finally resulted in the court's
issuing an injunction against all spending for public education. 87
Even though the educational tax scheme had to be declared unconstitutional, the court could have minimized the disruption to the
system through use of an alternative similar to that used in Shavers. Specifically, the court could have allowed the existing statutory scheme to remain in effect until the legislature acted rather
than appropriating funds itself on a yearly basis and unilaterally altering the appropriations formula. 88 The second standard should
also include a determination by a court that its use of unconstitutionality in futuro will appreciably increase the chance that it will
not in the end have to institute its own drastic remedy. The practical problem with this suggestion, however, is that it is difficult for

86
87
BB

Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. at 502-03, 303 A.2d at 288.
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson III), 67 N.J. 333, 350-51, 339 A.2d 193, 201-02.
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any court to foresee whether legislative compliance with the
court's suggested guidelines is probable. The subsequent history of
Robinson indicates that courts should not lightly assume that legislatures will be as anxious as they are to avoid disruption.
The third standard is whether the hardship on the group which
has relied on the present rule or present statutory scheme outweighs the hardship on the party denied the benefit of the new rule
or set of guidelines. Hardship should refer to both disruption of a
social practice or institution and the injustice which is done as a
result of maintaining the status quo until a determined time in the
future compared with the injustice done by immediately instituting
the new rule. The third standard thus requires courts to balance the
relative social costs of abrupt or delayed implementation of a
change which they have decided must take place.
The balancing required by the third standard limits unconstitutionality in futuro to cases in the public law litigation area which
challenge pervasive social programs. Both Shavers and Robinson
seem to satisfy the third standard. The hardship on motorists and
injured victims which would be created by voiding the No-Fault
Act as of the date of the opinion far outweighs the hardship on the
plaintiffs who are denied the benefit of new minimum due process
provisions. Likewise, the heavy reliance by the parties on the
existing educational tax scheme in New Jersey far outweighs the
benefits to be gained by ordering an immediate statutory shift.
Several conclusions may be drawn from the application of these
three standards. The balancing test in the third standard will always favor the use of unconstitutionality in futuro so long as it is
limited to challenges of broad social programs. The first two standards, however, limit the use of unconstitutionality in futuro within
the public law litigation area. These sanction its use only when
other alternatives are not available. When no other alternatives
exist, the less drastic means test requires that a court select
guidelines which will disrupt the program as little as possible. This
will, in most cases, require that the statutory scheme remain in effect until the legislature acts. Together, these standards outline a
program of judicial restraint in the use of unconstitutionality in futuro. They minimize the intrusion of the courts into the legislative
and administrative processes and so protect the courts' legitimacy
by keeping them within the bounds of their competence. The
standards also implicitly recognize the fact that all courts wili more
frequently be confronted with litigation requiring them to fashion
remedies responsive to interests beyond those of the parties directly involved in the suit.
3. Lack of Technical Expertise----The necessity of digesting the
large amount of technical data present in complex public law litiga-
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tion conflicts necessarily with the time constraints placed on any
lawsuit. Judges have neither the time nor the resources to make
in-depth sociological or statistical studies to help them reach a decision. Thus, there are time limits to the court's ability to make and
implement policy decisions within the framework of litigation. 89 By
the use of unconstitutionality in futuro, courts guarantee a deep
and time-consuming involvement with complex and technical issues and with the critical evaluation of various legislative or executive attempts to remedy the statute or statutory scheme. As the
Robinson cases demonstrate, one legislative attempt to remedy a
statute or statutory scheme and one critical evaluation by the court
may not be sufficient. 90
In addition to the time constraints which work against any court
involved in complex litigation and contemplating the use of a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro, courts also lack adequate
information-gathering apparata. 91 Unlike legislatures, which have
comparably more time to act on a given proposal and greater access to needed information through specialized committees and
legislative staffs, courts have traditionally been at the mercy of the
parties for fact and issue development, 92 and have not had the resources or personnel at their disposal for an elaborate analysis of
inforrnation. 93 The lack of information-gathering apparata and the
presence of time constraints have led courts to regard a single case
as an adequate representative of all cases in the area. Courts may
thus be tempted to treat a case as representative when the entire
thrust of the case is to the contrary. 94
To some extent, legislatures are faced with the same problem:

89
D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL PoLJCY 298 (1977). Horowitz states the
problem informatively:

It may be the limited scope of consultation, or the inability of courts to see how
their policies work out, or the difficulty of dealing with unusually fluid or broad
problems in an episodic and narrow framework, that stamps the judicial process
as more limited for some policy problems than other institutions are.
90
See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
91
See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 89, at 277-78. Horowitz considers the reliance which
the Supreme Court placed on empirical aids in formulating its opinion in Miranda, noting
that the decision has been criticized by police officers because it relied too heavily on
information contained in police manuals advocating extreme interrogation practices.
Horowitz states that the Court inferred the existence of a widespread practice on the basis
of advice given by the manuals, and as a result treated that issue in a vulnerable and uninformed fashion. Id. He concludes that sources of judicial information can affect both the
soundness of a decision and its legitimacy and impact: "A decision out of touch with the
reality familiar to the specialized functionaries affected by the decision may inspire
resistance rather than respect." Id. at 278.
92
Chayes, supra note 3, at 1283.
93
See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 89, at 279.
94
Goldstein, supra note 76, at 45-46.
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the input they recei-ve can be as unrepresentative of a given area as
a case may be. The difference is that legislators have control over
the weight given input from certain interest groups, while courts
are usually more dependent on the parties to the lawsuits before
them for determining the scope of issues presented .95
4. Administrative Shortcomings-The nature of the traditional
role of the courts in fashioning remedies tends to render courts incompetent to deal with on-going situations which demand flexible
plans and day-to-day attention to the subject matter of the litigation. When it issues a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro, a
court retains jurisdiction and frequently reviews the situation. This
automatically involves the court in the day-to-day operation of activities for which it has no formal training and little knowledge, taking it beyond the bounds of its competence and taxing its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 96
Competence encompasses much more than familiarity with the
subject matter of a statute or social program, such as the Michigan
Supreme Court had with the No-Fault Act. It includes having access to a wide range of informational resources, a willingness and
capacity to deal with far-reaching problems outside the narrow and
episodic framework of the traditional case, and the tools to insure
that the court-fashioned policies will be put into practice. 97
Courts which employ holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro
must be prepared for long-term administration and frequent re-

95 /d. at 45-47. This dependency is mitigated to some degree by the use of amicus curiae
briefs and court-appointed masters.
96 Use of the equitable decree enables a court to be involved in "a complex, on-going
regime of performance rather than a simple, one-shot, one-way transfer," and it prolongs
rather than terminates the court's role in the subject matter of the litigation. Chayes,
supra note 3, at 1298. See generally Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. I (1957), where the authors state:

The point is that the courts will draw from a body of experience not germane to
the problem they will face. Given their limited means of informing themselves
and the episodic nature of their efforts to do so, they will only dimly perceive the
situations on which they impose their order. Even if they do perceive, they will
necessarily come too late with a pound of "remedy" where the smaller measure
of prevention was needed. Their rules, tailored to the last bit of trouble, will
never catch up with the next and different dispute. They will allow or forbid and
be wrong in either event, because continuous, pragmatic, and flexible regulation
alone can help. They will on most occasions naturally shy away from basing their
judgments on what they are accustomed to regard as "political" factors incompatible with their disinterestedness, although these may form the only sensible
context of questions before them. And they will thus find themselves resting
judgment on trivia or irrelevancies. All this wi II not only, by its sheer volume,
divert the energies of the courts from their proper sphere but will also tend to
bring the judicial process into disrepute by exposing it as inadequate to a task
with which it should never have been entrusted_.
fd. at 25.
97
See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
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views of the process of compliance. 98 In most cases, they will lack
the capacity, tools, time, and therefore the competence to do an
effective job as an administrator. Even in such fundamental areas
as school desegregation 99 and school financing,1 °0 - areas in
which the courts have had substantial experience - courts have
not had the anticipated success in administering the remedies they
have mandated because the necessary degree of compliance from
legislatures and administrative agencies has not been forthcoming.1 °1 There is no reason to believe, in the light of the Shavers and
Robinson cases, that holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro will
induce greater or more immediate compliance than will prospective
holdings. This lack of willing compliance, if it continues for a long
period or is within a highly visible public concern, will tend to
exacerbate a court's loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Any court which contemplates employing a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro should be alerted to the fact that its holding will
be carefully scrutinized not only for its immediate effects but also
for the court's ability to secure future compliance.
C. Separation of Powers
1. Nature of the Doctrine-The separation of powers doctrine is
closely allied with the concerns of judicial legitimacy and competency. It will serve to limit a court's decision to implement a program after holding a statute unconstitutional in futuro.
The federal version of this doctrine generally forbids the courts
from interfering with the operations of the other two branches by
trying to correct defects in statutes or by replacing statutes with
rules of their own. 102 Many state constitutions contain a clause
98

This statement also holds true for rulings which are applied prospectively.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. l, 413 U.S.
189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown[), 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
100
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson[), 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973).
101
For an interesting account of one court's attempt to administer changes which it had
ordered in a state's mental institutions, see Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a
Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
102
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1970), rehearing denied, 402 U.S. 990 (1970)
(the Court is not constitutionally empowered to overturn a state's legislative choice under
the guise of constitutional interpretation because the Justices believe they can provide
better rules); Winningham v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 371 F. Supp.
ll40 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff d, 512 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1975) (Article III of the Constitution
does not confer the power on federal courts to correct the shortcomings and asperities of
statutes by what amounts to judicial legislation); Holmes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 370 F. Supp. 715 (D. V .I. 1974) (the judicial branch may not encroach on or interfere
with the proper exercise of the powers which have been lawfully delegated to the legislative branch); Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State
99
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similar to the one in the Michigan Constitution, "[n]o person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch, except as expressly provided in this constitution." 1 03
The line between permissible judicial interpretation and impermissible judicial legislation is acknowledged to be narrow. 104 But
contrary to the traditional view, which sharply distinguished between the legislative and judicial functions, 105 the contemporary
view is that the separation of powers doctrine is contravened only
by the degree of involvement which one branch has in another
branch's affairs, 106 and is thus not to be regarded as an absolute
prohibition on that involvement. 107 The separation of powers doctrine is viewed as a general principle applied to maintain checks
and balances between the three governmental branches. 108 In
slightly different terms, it is directed not at the danger of "blended
v. O'Brien, 272 F. Supp. 712 (D.D.C. 1967) (courts may not control or supervise the operations of the other two branches of government).
103
MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2. See also .Ai.A. CONST. art. 3, § 43; ARIZ. CONST. art. 3;
ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. 3; CONN. CONST. art.
2; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, ,i 4; IDAHO CONST. art. 2, § 1; ILL.
CONST. art. 2, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1; low A CONST. art 3, § 1; KY. CONST.§§ 27 & 28;
LA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1 & 2; ME. CONST. art. 3, §§ 1 & 2; Mo. CONST. art. 8; MASS.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 30; MINN. CONST. art. 3; Miss. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1 & 2; Mo ..CoNsT. art.
2, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. 4; NEB. CONST. art. 2; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1; N. C. CONST.
art. 1, § 6; N. H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 37; N. J. CONST. art. 3; N. M. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OKLA.
CONST. art. 4; ORE. CONST. art. 3, § 1; R. I. CoNST. art. 3; S. C. CONST. art 1, § 8; S. D.
CONST. art. 2; TENN. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1 & 2; TEX. CONST. art. 2, § l; UTAH CONST. art. 5,
§ 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 5; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § l; WYO. CONST.
art. 2, § I. The states whose constitutions do not contain a provision relating to the separation of powers are: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Washington, and Wisconsin.
10
• See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (courts
must be careful so as not to cross the "gossamer line which sometimes separates proper
judicial interpretation from judicial usurpation of the legislative function").
1 os See note 57 supra.
10
• A. Cox, supra note 47, at 99.
107
United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835,840 (S.D.N. Y. 1963). The court stated:
Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in 1953 wrote:
"The division of government into three branches does not imply, as its critics
would have us think, three watertight compartments. Montesquieu, as we have
seen, knew better; the three departments, he said, must move 'in concert.' "
(Emphasis supplied) .... The isolation of these powers is not intended and any
complete division between departments is impossible.
(footnote omitted).
10
• See Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N .J. 133, 174, 351 A .2d 713, 735, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975) (Mountain, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion with Justice
Clifford, Justice Mountain stated:
Clearly today the doctrine of the separation of powers cannot be said to require a
complete compartmentalization along triadic lines. More and more courts have
come to recognize that where a practical necessity exists, a blending of powers
will be countenanced, but only so long as checks and balances are present to
guard against abuses.
Id. at 178, 351 A.2d at 737 (emphasis in original).
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power" but at the danger of "unchecked power. " 109
General standards which determine when one branch has impermissibly interfered with another branch's internal affairs have
been established. For example, federal courts may not interfere
with the management of the internal affairs of either house of Congress, nor may they judge the qualifications of its members. 110
Federal courts may not control or supervise the management or
operations of departments or agencies of the executive branch. 111
More generally, federal courts may not interfere with powers. that
have been lawfully delegated to the legislature,1 12 nor may they
supply missing portions of statutes which are under-inclusive in
their scope. 113 Michigan state courts are guided by a separation of
powers standard which displays the same spirit as the federal
standards. While they may pass upon the constitutional validity of
statutes and ordinances, Michigan state courts cannot compel
legislative bodies to act in one way or another, as when they try to
compel members of a city council to amend an ordinance . 114 New
Jersey state courts have a duty to say what the law is and not what
they think it should be, as in the case of the legislature's failure to
remove an unemancipated child's immunity from tort suit. 115
These standards require courts to make judgments ·of degree.
The question of degree can be analyzed into two separate questions: (1) How much should a court limit constitutional adjudication to cases and remedies which have traditionally been the province of judicial determination or, how much should it expand judicial intervention into the affairs of the other branches? (2) To what
extent should a court's decisions and orders be guided by considerations of policy taken independently of existing law, and to what
extent by the law as it stands or by criteria and standards which a
court considers binding even though it would reach another conclusion if it were not bound by the law? 116
10 • K. DAVIS, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 1.09 at 68 (1958). See also Myers V.
U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis, dissenting, stated:

The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted ... not to promote efficiency
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
110
Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. O'Brien,
272 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D.D.C. 1967).
111 Id.
112 Holmes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 370 F. Supp. 715, 723 (D. V .I. 1974).
113 Winningham v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 371 F. Supp. 1140, ll51
(S. D. Ga. 1974), qffd, 512 F.2d 617 (5th. Cir. 1975).
114
Randall v. Meridian Township Bd., 34i Mich. 605, 608, 70 N .W .2d 728, 729 (1955).
11
• Bush v. Bush, 95 N. J. Super. 368,231 A.2d 245 (1967).
116
A. Cox, supra note 47, at 99. In Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267
N.W.2d 72 (1978), Justice Ryan remarks:

Our stated and restated deference to the legislative function, as embodied in the
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2. Substance/Procedure Distinctions-If a court holds a statutory scheme void as of the date of its opinion, no violation of the
separation of powers doctrine is likely to be found, since it has lohg
been accepted that it is within the judicial function to suggest approaches which would remedy constitutional deficiencies to the
legislature and to retain jurisdiction to monitor the effect of any
remedy given. 117 Unconstitutionality in futuro, in contrast, allows
a court to consider independent policy factors and thus dangerously encroach on the provinces of the other branches through the
interaction of the factors of delayed timing and suggested
guidelines.
In analyzing the appropriate use of unconstitutionality in futurn,
one factor which arguably should influence the freedom with which
a court may consider independent policy issues is whether the
court is dealing with a procedural or substantive problem. Arguably, the dangers inherent in holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro may be greater when they are used to compel changes in substantively defective statutes than when they are used in an attempt
to correct procedurally deficient statutes. In the former case, the
court is more likely to intrude on the public policy and political
sphere, which have traditionally been deemed within the province
of the legislature. 118 When correcting procedural defects, the court

familiar doctrine of presumptive constitutional validity, is no mere verbalism. Its
source is the doctrine of separation of powers and its lifeblood is judicial selfrestraint. We are not free to strike down this revolutionary new concept of compensation for motor vehicle caused injury and damage because we may think it to
be unwise or even at odds with our personal notions of what is fair. We test for
constitutional collision. If there is none, like it or not, we ought to decline to disturb the legislative will. Stated otherwise, our review and judgment must be such
as to not unduly hamper the Legislature's freedom to experiment and innovate
by superimposing our judgment as to the expediency or wisdom of the legislation
over theirs. This necessary policy of deference affords the Legislature ample
scope for putting its prophesies to the test of proof.
Id. at fi64-65, 267 N.W.2d at 118 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
117
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S.' 51 (1965); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118
See Jaffe, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1112 (1963). See also Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1186-87 (1977). Professor
Sandalow writes concerning the process by which legislation is legitimized through enactment by Congress:
That process confers legitimacy upon the decision not merely because it registers
consent in some abstract way but, as I have urged elsewhere, because political responsibility is crucial to the democratic ideal that governmental policies ought to
respond to the wishes of the citizenry ... First, it provides a means by which government is made more sensitive to the impact of a policy upon the various segments
of the society and thereby contributes to the calculation of gains and losses resulting from that policy. Second, since an appraisal of the consequences of policy involves not merely a measurement of gains and losses, but a judgment of what is to
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is less likely to override policy decisions made by the legislature or
the executive by instituting a court-generated rule which merely effectuates the goal of the substantive rule.
It is a close question whether the Shavers court violated the separation of powers doctrine as it is presently conceived. The list of
minimum due process guarantees which the court suggested fall
within the area ofrecognizedjudicial competence and so the risk of
the court imposing its own arbitrary and subjective policy g-0als in
place of fully researched and debated legislative policy goals is
small. Robinson, however, violates the separation of powers doctrine. In ordering that the funds for the 1976-77 school year be allocated under an "incentive equalization aid formula" instead of the
formula under existing statutes, the court arguably took for itself
the power of appropriation, which the New Jersey Constitution
places squarely in the hands of the state legislature . 119 When the
power to appropriate funds, which is constitutionally and traditionally a legislative power, is taken by a court, there is a much
greater danger of judicial incompetence and hence arbitrariness
than when a court, for example, sets minimum due process standards. There is far less assurance that the power to appropriate
funds will be controlled or checked in the way that the separation
of powers doctrine contemplates. This would indicate that there is
less reason to object on separation of powers grounds to the use of
unconstitutionality in futuro in a Shavers-type case than in a
Robinson-type case.
3. Judicial Responses-Unconstitutionality in futuro also raises
separation of powers concerns since it creates an odd and disquieting amalgam of judicial restraint and activism, in which the court
on the one hand defers to the legislative will but on the other
strongly suggests the desired response. For example, the judicial
approach to due process has traditionally been either to read due
process requirements directly into the procedurally vague sta-

count as a gain or loss and how these shall be balanced, political responsibility
helps ensure that governmental policy will not depart too far from the values of the
citizenry. Finally, the political responsibility of the legislature creates an incentive
for compromise and accommodation that facilitates developments of policies that
maximize the satisfaction of constituents' desires. A consensus achieved through a
broadly representative political process is, thus, as close as we are likely to get to
the statement of a norm which can be said to reflect the values of the society.
Id. at 1187 (citation omitted).
119
The New Jersey Constitution requires the New Jersey Legislature to "provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the
instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N. J.
CoNST. art. 8, § 4, 'ii I.
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tute 1 20 or to strike the statute down immediately, 121 depending on
the extent of its vagueness. But in Shavers, the court chose neither
of these alternatives. Instead, it required legislative action to accomplish what it could have accomplished itself, though it left the
legislature with a clear idea of what an acceptable solution would
be.
The same amalgam of judicial restraint and activism is present in
the Robinson cases. In Robinson I the guidelines consisted of the
mandate to define the state's obligation to provide a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools. 122 The court presented the
legislature with a choice between imposing a statewide property
tax, in which case it must tax all the taxable property in the state,
or assigning the taxing function to local government, in which case
the tax must fall uniformly upon all taxable property within the
county or municipality . 1 23 Two years later, when Robinson was
again before it, the New Jersey Supreme Court was reluctant to go
further than the issuance of a provisional remedy for the 1976-77
school year because "it would [have been] premature and inappropriate for the Court at the present posture of this complex matter to
undertake, a priori, a comprehensive blueprint for 'thorough and
efficient' education, and seek to impose it upon the other Branches
of government." 124 Yet, in deciding to order that funds for the
school year 1976-77 should not be disbursed as provided under
then-existing statutes, the court characterized itself as "the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution's command." 125
The Shavers and Robinson courts are engaging in both judicial

120
See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I (1947), in which the Court held that
the due process requirement is complied with by a statute whose language marks sufficiently distinct boundaries for judges and juries to administer the law in accordance with
the legislative will. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court, citing Petrillo, remarked that if the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is
plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be imagined where doubts might arise. Id. at 618. For a recent example of
a court's reading standards into a vague statute, see People v. Neumayer, No. 59093
(Mich. Sup. Ct., Feb. 5, 1979), in which the court read into the Michigan criminal obscenity statute, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. 750.343a-.343b (1970), the standards announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The court held
that, as it stood, the Michigan criminal obscenity statute lacks the specificity required ofa
statute which seeks to regulate speech or expression.
121
See, e.g., Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,287 (1961) (a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must guess at the meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
122
62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297.
123
Id. at 502-03, 303 A.2d at 288.
124
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson JV), 69 N.J. at 144, 351 A.2d at 718.
125
/d. at 154,351 A.2dat 724.
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and legislative functions .126 Their judicial function consists in their
ruling on the constitutionality of two statutory schemes. 127 They
have also undertaken, through the use of delayed timing, suggested
guidelines, and retention of jurisdiction, to define broad policy objections and to move the legislature to directed action. The presence of judicial activism and restraint in the same litigation produces a dynamic which alternately pushes the court ahead to provide temporary remedies and holds it back from fashioning a final
solution. As the case is prolonged, however, the pressure on the
court may force it to take drastic steps, such as the Robinson VI
court took in issuing the injunction against further spending for
public education. 128 This dynamic inevitably prolongs the court's
role in the litigation and may in the long run exacerbate the problem. In Robinson, what began as an exercise in extreme judicial restraint became in the end a clear example of judicial activism and
an intrusion on the legislative function. Thus, the postponement of
the effect of a holding of unconstitutionality in futuro will tend to
produce an effect opposite to the one hoped for by the court. Instead of a legislature quickly acting to remedy a constitutionally deficient statute or statutory scheme, it may fail altogether to act out
of a "despairing willingness ... to dump its problems upon the
court." 129 Furthermore, because the judicial exercise of the legislative function is delayed and is conditioned upon the legislative or
executive branch's failure to act, healthy criticism of the court's
action is rendered premature and hence less effective.
The problem of degree which inheres in the contemporary doctrine of the separation of powers is not confined to holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro, but affects all judicial activity in the
realm of public law litigation. Whenever statutory schemes of great
social importance come before a court novel remedies are called
for, some of which may unavoidably require the judicial branch to
perform functions which belong to the other branches. ·This is
especially true if, as occurred in Brown and Robinson, and as yet
may occur in Shavers, the legislature refuses to comply with judi126

/d. at 154-55, 351 A.2d at TI4. The court stated:

This Court, as the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution's command,
possesses and must use power equal to its responsibility. Sometimes, unavoidably
incident thereto and in response to a constitutional mandate, the Court must act,
even in a sense seem to encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other Branches of
government. And while the court does so, when it must, with restraint and even
reluctance, there comes a time when no alternative remains. That time has now
arrived.
(citation omitted).
127
But see note 69 and accompanying text supra.
128
70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
12
• A. Cox, supra note 47, at 95.
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cially suggested guidelines. The question whether the judiciary has
an affirmative duty to compel compliance by the other branches
when it determines that the Constitution demands it has been
called "the next great challenge of American constitutionalism." 130 It often happens that the choice is between the
court doing the bestjob it can and no one doing it at all. 131 Courts
have already been forced to choose between permitting an unconstitutional scheme to continue and acting themselves to remedy the
sittiation. 132 Such acts should not be undertaken lightly, however,

130

Id. at 98.
Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism
or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. I, 5-6 (1968).
132
For an example of when it was deemed necessary and proper for a court to so act,
see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In affirming the district court's order for temporary reapportionment of the Alabama Legislature for the 1962 general election, the
Court stated that the district court had "acted wisely in declining to stay the impending
primary election ... and properly refrained from acting further until the Alabama Legislature had been given the opportunity to remedy the admitted discrepancies in the State's
legislative apportionment scheme, while initially stating some of its views to provide
guidelines for legislative action." Id. at 586. The Court remanded the case to the district
court "[s]ince the District Court evinced its realization that its ordered reapportionment
could not be sustained as the basis for conducting the 1966 election of Alabama legislators, and avowedly intends to take some further action should the reapportioned
Alabama Legislature fail to enact a constitutionally valid, permanent apportionment
scheme in the interim ... ."Id.at 587. Reynolds clearly shares many features in common
with holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro. The main difference is that the district court
did not postpone the effect of its holding to a future date. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431
(M.D. Ala. 1962) (the district court decisions in the Reynolds controversy are reported
sub nom. Sims v. Frink). The Supreme Court stated, in effect, that this was a case in
which the judiciary had to act: "No effective political remedy to obtain relief against the
alleged malapportionment of the Alabama Legislature appears to have been available. No
initiative procedure exists under Alabama law." 377 U.S. at 553 (footnote omitted).
For a recent Supreme Court decision which provided a solution similar to the one provided in Reynolds, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976). Buckley was an action against
the Federal Election Commission and various government officials which challenged certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. §§431-455, 18
U .S.C. §§ 591-607) and the provisions of Subtitle Hof the Internal Revenue Act of 1954
(I.R.C. §§ 9031-9042) for public financing of Presidential election campaigns. The plaintiffs also contended that the method of appointment of members of the Federal Election
Commission violated the principle of the separation of powers. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(I) provides that two of the six voting members are to be appointed by the President pro tempore
of the Senate, two are to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, and two are to be
appointed by the President, with all six members being subject to confirmation by the
majority ofboth Houses. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held, inter alia, that the
method of appointment of the members of the Federal Election Commission violated the
principle of separation of powers insofar as the Commission performed rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement powers under the statutes, although the Commission, as it
was then constituted, could properly exercise investigative powers. But in fashioning a
remedy, the Court stated:
131

It is also our view that the Commission's inability to exercise certain powers because of the method by which its members have been selected should not affect
the validity of the Commission's administration of those provisions, upheld today, authorizing the public financing of federal elections. The past acts of the
Commission are therefore accorded de facto validity, just as we have recognized
should be the case with respect to legislative acts performed by legislators held to
have been elected in accordance with an unconstitutional apportionment plan.
We also draw on the Court's practice in the apportionment and voting rights

294

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 12:2

for each bold decision brings the court into the political arena,
where its legitimacy can be questioned. 133
IV.

CONCLUSION

Unconstitutionality in futuro is likely to present the problem of
judicial encroachment on the functions of the other two branches
and the dilemma between judicial restraint and activism in every
case in which it is employed. Because of its three features of the
delayed effect of the holding, suggested guidelines, and retained
jurisdiction, it is an attractive remedy and has the unique capability
to ensure that courts will undertake the challenge to do what no
one else will do. But because of thejudiciary's demonstrated lack
of competence in overseeing long-term remedies and in setting
adequate standards for and limits on further intervention, unconstitutionality in futuro also ensures that this task will most often be
done poorly.
The short-term difficulties which accompany holdings of unconstitutionality in futuro, and which were highlighted in Robinson,
certainly deserve close scrutiny. But even more important are the
long-term adverse effects, the erosion in a court's legitimacy and
its effectiveness, which a court risks if it employs unconstitutionality in futuro without first measuring the demands of the specific
situation against a set of established judicial standards and consid..:
ering the utility of other less drastic solutions.
-Philip H. Hecht

cases and stay, for a period not to exceed 30 days, the Court's judgment insofar
as it affects the authority of the Commission to exercise the duties and powers
granted to it under the Act. This limited stay will afford Congress an opportunity
to reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement
mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the Court sustains, allowing the present Commission in the interim to function de facto in accordance with the substantive provisions of the Act.

Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted).
133 Jaffe, supra note Il8, at 1112.

